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ABSTRACT
BAILEY BROWN BURLESON: Support for Regionalist and Nationalist Political Parties
in Spain (Under the direction of Dr. Miguel Centellas)
This research investigates the variation across the autonomous communities of
Spain in the level of support for both regionalist and nationalist political parties such as
the new far-right political party, Vox. This research looks at four cases: Andalusia,
Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. Together these cases represent a spectrum of regionalist
sentiment, support for regionalist parties, and support for nationalist parties. Using survey
data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas ahead of the Spanish general
election of November 2019, this thesis analyzes individual-level determinants of voting
behavior corresponding to regionalist and nationalist political parties in Spain. Of the
individual-level determinants of voting behavior with regard to the particular parties, the
demographic variables such as gender, age, religiosity, education level, and ideological
self-placement as well as the perception of immigration as a major Spanish issue showed
the greatest distinction between voters of regionalist parties and voters of nationalist
parties. Economic and political evaluations, the influence of the Catalan Independence
Movement, and personal income were variables that were significant in the same manner
across all types of parties studied.
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Introduction
There is a varying degree of support for regionalist political parties. In certain
autonomous communities, substate nationalism and strong regional identification has
historically been more prevalent. Catalonia has made news recently for its strong support
for an independence movement and has very often had strong support for regionalist
political parties even in Spanish general elections. However, certain autonomous
communities like Andalusia have not had the same level of support for these types of
parties. In an autonomous community like Andalusia, there has been some level of
support for regionalist parties in more local elections but not strong enough to appear in
national elections. Instead, Andalusia has seen recent support in national elections for
Vox, a party that represents many of the opposite views of regionalist parties with regard
to the Spanish state. This presents a curious case in which Andalusia could have the
potential to have growth in their regionalist party support but instead has growth of the
opposite type of party.
Various Catalan regionalist parties have had a degree of electoral success. These
parties can be found on both sides of the political ideological spectrum, and not all
Catalan regionalist parties advocate for separatism. Some examples of Catalan regionalist
parties that have had electoral success are Together for Catalonia (Junts per Catalunya,
JxCAT), Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC), and
Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP). Regionalist parties
similar to the types found in Catalonia are found in other autonomous communities, but
1

not all of these have been as successful in elections. An example of this is one of
Andalusia’s recent semi-prominent regionalist parties the Andalusian Party (Partido
Andalucista, PA) that dissolved in 2014 after merging with another party and losing
seats.
However, Spain has also, until the past few years, lacked a strong far-right
movement. This “Spanish Exceptionalism” (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, Ortiz Barquero
2019) appears to be at its end with the creation and rise in popularity of the party Vox. In
the most recent elections, Andalusia has seen growing support for Vox, a right-wing
nationalist party that advocates for a more united Spain with less emphasis on individual
autonomous communities. Support for Vox has grown throughout Spain in recent years
but not equally in every autonomous community. An example of this is how Catalonia
has had much less support for Vox than Andalusia has had.
Why does support for regionalist parties vary across the different autonomous
communities of Spain? Why has a nationalist party like Vox found electoral success in
Andalusia and other autonomous communities across Spain when it is seemingly the
antithesis of a regionalist party and substate nationalism? This research examines
individual factors that influence voting behavior pertaining to the rise of far-right parties,
the strength of regionalist parties, and any potential interaction between the two.

Nationalism and Party Success or Failure
The substate nationalism and sense of identity that exists in Spain’s autonomous
communities prompts the creation of regionalist parties that either advocate for more
autonomy with the extreme case being independence or advocate for certain issues on
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behalf of the autonomous community. According to the constructivist school of thought,
national identity is created rather than something that has always existed in a community
or group (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1992, Gellner and Breuilly 2008). This school
stresses the fact that nationalism and the idea of a nation is a relatively new concept in the
history of the world. One of the major points of Hobsbawm (1990) is that nationalism is a
product of modernity. Anderson (2016) discusses how print capitalism as well as the
decline of older, powerful institutions such as the Catholic church and “the dynastic
realm” have led to the birth and growth of nationalism agreeing with the idea that
nationalism has only come about in more recent eras of history.
Anderson writes that a nation is an “imagined political community” (2016). He
elaborates that a nation is made up of people that feel a connection towards other
members of the group whether or not they personally know the other members. In other
words, there exists a national consciousness (Anderson 2016). Hobsbawm (1990) asserts
that this “national consciousness” does not exist evenly across a state and agrees that it is
not an idea that predates states or nations. In fact, many constructivist thinkers
(Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner and Breuilly 2008) directly assert that it is nationalism itself
that created the “nation”.
My research relates to this particular definition of nations and nationalism
because I examine variables that may be relevant in how individuals and the autonomous
communities create these identities and in how that relates to the success of regionalist
and nationalist political parties. In other words, my research looks at the individual-level
variables that are common in individuals who choose to align with regionalist or
nationalist political parties.
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A second major concept with my research is why parties fail or succeed. Heinrich
W. Ursprung (1984) identifies two different types of explanations for party success:
theories of a sociological nature or theories from the economic approach. The economic
approach is that economic reasons can explain all types of human behavior while the
sociological approach operates under the assumption that certain sociological variables
can influence attitudes and behaviors of individuals (Ursprung 1984). In Ursprung’s
(1984) view, the reasoning behind the economic approach is that economic motives can
explain human behavior and that humans, as rational beings, will act in their own benefit
in an attempt to accomplish their desires. This relates to voting behavior because voters
will vote in a manner that will benefit them. In later chapters, this will be relevant to
theories such as the “losers” of modernization theory in which individuals are likely to
vote in opposition to what they see as the cause of their economic troubles. The
sociological approach looks at how a variety of determinants influence the individual and
their preferences (Ursprung 1984).
Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (1988) propose a theory of linkage in which
major parties “fail” when they fail to provide enough effective linkage between the
individuals and the state. They discuss how alternative organizations in four categories,
environmentalist, supplementary, communitarian, and anti-authoritarian, have been able
to gain support (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Another topic discussed is the definitions of
“failure” or “success”. These definitions can be relative: a major party might define
success as being the party in charge of the government, while success for a minor party
might entail being part of a coalition government or having its goals adopted by a major
party (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Through my analysis, I can identify particular groups of
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people that might be affected by this failure of linkage with the major parties and have
instead turned to peripheral parties.

Research Design
In order to look at reasons for certain parties receiving or not receiving electoral
support, I analyze individual-level variables as determinants for voting for each type of
political party involved in my original research question: both nationalist and regionalist.
I include four different particular cases that each represent a spectrum of regionalist
sentiment as well as support for either nationalist or regionalist parties.

Case Selection
In choosing my cases, I was interested in two main variables: regionalist vs.
nationalist sentiment and support for regionalist or nationalist political parties. I wanted
to have a spectrum that represented several combinations of these variables. The four
cases I have chosen are: Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and Murcia. Catalonia and Galicia
are both what is described as “historic nations” or autonomous communities that have
been designated as having greater cultural distinctiveness and consequently greater
regionalist sentiment. However, the support for regionalist parties is not the same across
all of these autonomous communities that are “historic nations.” Catalonia has a much
higher level of support for regionalist parties than Galicia. Regionalist sentiment and
identity is also not the same across the other autonomous communities. Preliminary data
shows that Andalusia has a lower sense of regional identity than the historic nations like
Catalonia, but it does have a higher sense of regional identity compared to an
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autonomous community like Murcia. Vox, a far-right nationalist party, also has a high
level of support in Andalusia and Murcia.
Andalusia, my primary case, is an outlier through its contradictions. Andalusia
does have a moderately high level of regionalist sentiment compared to an autonomous
community such as Murcia. However, regionalist parties have not had much electoral
support in Andalusia, when compared to other autonomous communities like Catalonia
and the Basque Country. In recent elections, there has also been high support for Vox, a
Spanish nationalist party that wants to deemphasize autonomous communities, in
Andalusia. This is interesting because not only does Andalusia have a lack of significant
support for regionalist parties, but it also has shown to have greater support for a party
that might be considered an opposite to regionalist parties.
Catalonia, my second case, is frequently classified as a historic nation. While
similar to Andalusia in that the regionalist sentiment is higher than in other autonomous
communities, Catalonia has a different outcome. In Catalonia, support is higher for
regionalist parties than in Andalusia. Regionalist parties have even had success at the
national level. Support for Vox is much lower in Catalonia. Since certain undeniable
differences exist between an autonomous community like Catalonia and an autonomous
community like Andalusia, I include two more cases to provide additional controls.
Galicia is another autonomous community that is frequently described as a
“historic nation” or “historic nationality”. In contrast to Catalonia, however, it does not
have the same high level of support for regionalist parties. In fact, it can be considered an
outlier among the historic nations in that it does not have the same level of support for
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regionalist parties in their political system like Catalonia or the Basque Country (Hamann
1999).
Murcia and Andalusia have had some of the highest growth in support for Vox
while the “historic nations'' like Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country have had
some of the lowest growth in Vox. While both Galicia and the Basque Country would be
interesting additions to my research, I believe that Galicia would be the better addition as
it has more differences in level of regionalist party support to Catalonia than the Basque
Country does.

Data Sources
I plan to use survey data produced by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
My data for my analysis comes from the survey titled “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019”
(Barometer of November 2019). This data was gathered through interviews conducted in
the weeks preceding the national election of November 2019. The survey asks
respondents about what party they intend to vote for in that election as well as a variety
of questions pertaining to demographic information, political opinions, and economic
status. I also reference some regional post electoral surveys. These surveys are the most
recent post electoral surveys for each case that was provided by the Centro de
Investigaciones Sociológicas: Catalonia (Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones
Autonómicas 2017), Andalusia (Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2018 Comunidad
Autónoma de Andalucía 2018), Murcia (Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2015.
Región de Murcia 2015), and Galicia (Postelectoral de Galicia. Elecciones Autonómicas
2016).
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Dependent Variable
My dependent variables are support for two types of peripheral political parties
paying special attention to my cases of Catalonia, Andalusia, Murcia, and Galicia.
“Nationalist parties” are those parties that advocate for Spanish nationalism or are
in direct opposition to substate nationalisms within Spain. “Nationalist parties” includes
both Ciudadanos and Vox. However, as is discussed later in this paper, Ciudadanos is not
as extreme as Vox. Therefore, I have also decided to look at the voters for Vox separately
as a subcategory of nationalist parties.
“Regionalist parties” are the regional parties within at least one of my cases that
advocate for greater autonomy for the autonomous community they represent. However,
it is important to note that nationalism is a factor in both of these types of parties.
“Regionalist parties” include regionalist parties from Catalonia and Galicia. Of all my
cases, only regionalist parties from Catalonia and Galicia received support from the
respondents for the upcoming election. I have also decided to create two subcategories of
“regionalist parties.” These two subcategories are “Catalan regionalist parties” and
“Galician regionalist parties.” These different subcategories will allow me to see any
differences between the individual determinants that affect a voter’s decision to vote for
regionalist parties of each autonomous community.

Independent Variables
My independent variables are categorized into three groups: demographic
variables, performance variables, and political variables. Demographic variables include
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gender, age, religiosity, education level, and personal income. Performance-related
variables include the perception of the current economic situation in Spain and the
perception of the current political situation in Spain. Political variables include the
influence of Catalan independence movement on vote, self-placement on a left-right scale
of ideology, and choice of major issues facing Spain.

Hypotheses
I develop the following hypotheses to explain a voter’s choice.
●

H1: As negative feelings about the current political situation increase, support for
peripheral parties like the regionalist parties or Vox will increase.

●

H2: People who state that their vote was influenced by the independence
movement in Catalonia will be more likely to vote for peripheral parties, whether
regionalist parties or Vox.

●

H3: People who state that one of the major problems facing Spain is immigration
will be more likely to vote for Vox.

●

H4: The Catalan Independence Movement will be an important issue for voters of
all types of parties.

Structure of Paper
After this brief introduction, Chapter 1 focuses on broad theories and concepts
underlying my research such as nationalism and party success and failure. Chapter 2
narrows the focus to Spain-specific background information on the political system
relating to substate nationalism and previous research done surrounding these topics.
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Chapter 3 includes a brief overview of each case as well as some descriptive statistics
providing background on how each autonomous community stands with regard to
nationalistic sentiment and voting behavior. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the political
parties included in my analysis and how they are organized into my dependent variables.
Chapter 5 presents my data and analysis as well as more in-depth information on
methodology. My conclusion follows Chapter 5.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review

Nationalism
The study of nationalism focuses primarily around two schools of thought:
primordialism and constructivism. Primordialism is the idea that nations and the qualities
that define nations have always been salient and present. Nations are set in stone and
have always existed among groups of people. Constructivism refers to the idea that
nationalism and the sense of “nation-ness” is a constructed idea or concept by the group
of people that it pertains to. A nation is not defined by unchangeable criteria or qualities
but rather by the changing perceptions and beliefs about identity of the people within the
so-called “nation”.
In the words of Benedict Anderson (2016), a nation is an “imagined community”
because while no member can be fully acquainted with every other member of the
“nation,” each feels a connection to the other creating a salient and distinct group in the
eyes of the community. These nations are often defined by cultural, linguistic, and ethnic
differences that seem to have always defined groups and “nations,” but it is important to
note that, in the constructivist school of thought, “nationalism” is a new movement and
idea that came to be with the modern era (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1990, Gellner and
Breuilly 2008). Modernity and elements that caused the modern age like print capitalism
caused the growth of nationalism (Anderson 2016, Hobsbawm 1990).
11

It is also important to note that the “nation” and the “state,” while often conflated
in common speech, are not equivalent (Gellner and Breuilly 2008). This is evident in how
with certain states such as Spain, the national consciousness and the sense of identity of
citizens are not evenly distributed. The “nation” and the “state” are not equally strong and
defined entities. This makes it interesting to look at the competing “nations” within a
state like Spain.

Party Success and Failure
When thinking about the success or failure of political parties, it is important to
consider what qualifies as a success or failure. Depending on the particular study or
purpose of research, each can be defined differently. Success can be defined as becoming
the party of the government, winning elections, receiving some support in elections (in
the case of peripheral parties), or even having the agenda of a peripheral party adopted by
a major political party (Lawson and Merkl 2007). This last idea about what qualifies as
success can be attributed to a type of political party that Lawson and Merkl label as a
supplementary political party which represents particular policies that might be adopted
by a mainstream party if the supplementary party receives enough attention from the
public (1988). Parties like supplementary parties as well as parties that are labelled as
environmentalist, communitarian, and anti-authoritarian are the parties that are given
support when the major political parties “fail” (Lawson and Merkl 2007).
Failure for political parties can be defined as what happens when major or
mainstream parties fail to garner the same amount of electoral support or are in decline in
the political arena of a country (Lawson and Merkl 1988). When, this happens, something
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else will take up that place with voters whether they be movements or peripheral parties.
Lawson and Merkl hypothesize that the reasons major parties fail and minor parties gain
support is through the linkage theory (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Linkage theory states
that major parties lose support when they fail to provide adequate connections or
“linkage” between the voter and the party’s decisions and actions (Lawson and Merkl
1988). After this failure to link the voter and the party, the voters may look elsewhere for
that desired linkage and connection (Lawson and Merkl 1988).

Theories Applied in Existing Research
Articles studying party success or failure in Spain look at several different
theories that might explain voting behavior. The basis of these theories varies from
economic, cultural identity, and even psychological. Below is a brief overview of
theories referenced in regard to voting determinants that were most common in the
existing literature.

Regional Language
A primordialist perspective of nationalism proposes that there are certain cultural
and ethnic factors that make a “nation” and decide the strength of behavior related to that
“nation.” In the context of Spain, the most distinctive cultural element that separates one
autonomous community from the other is the presence of a regional language. Many
theorists (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Sorens 2005) study how much a regional language
affects behavior and regionalist sentiment.
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Economic Development and Losers of Modernization Theory
In economic terms, theorists (Sorens 2005, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias
2018, Bollen and Medrano 1998, Ortiz Barquero 2019) studying Spain often look at data
relevant to the wealth of autonomous communities as a whole or the wealth of individuals
and how likely they are to support certain movements to autonomy as well as opinions
toward immigrants. Sorens (2005) discusses if, at the regional level, there would be
greater economic benefit of greater autonomy/secessionism. Autonomous communities
that would be worse off after independence, like Andalusia, would be less likely to
support secessionism; therefore, the hypothesis would follow that wealthier regions
would be more supportive of a potential move towards independence (Sorens 2005). This
same logic could apply to individuals who feel that they would suffer economic losses if
the situation of autonomy changed.
The theory of the “losers” of modernization is a theory most often applied to
voters of far-right nationalist parties that suffer losses as a result of modernization and
globalization (Bollen and Medrano 1998, Ortiz Barquero 2019, Georgiadou, Rori, and
Roumanias 2018). This theory will be discussed more fully in the following chapter in
the section on “Spanish Exceptionalism.”

Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric
A theory closely related to that of the losers of modernization theory in much of
the existing research is the identity vulnerability theory that relates to anti-immigrant
sentiment (Ortiz Barquero 2019, Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018). The “losers”
of modernization can often become anti-immigrant when their economic losses are
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accompanied by a growth of discourse about immigration (Georgiadou, Rori, and
Roumanias 2018). Ortiz Barquero (2019) hypothesizes that due to the increasing salience
of immigration in Spain and Andalusia, the rise of far-right political parties can be in part
explained by the fear of immigrants as a threat to national identity and traditional
religion.

15

Chapter 2
Spanish Political System and Case Overview

Spain is divided into seventeen autonomous communities each with varying
degrees of autonomy. Many of these autonomous communities have distinct cultures and
even languages in certain autonomous communities such as Galicia, Catalonia, and the
Basque Country. Certain ones of these autonomous communities have been designated as
“historic nations” in Spain and are often given higher degrees of autonomy. Within these
particular autonomous communities, it is often more common to have regionalist parties
that receive a higher level of support and a higher level of substate nationalism

Center-Periphery Cleavage
When studying political parties in Spain, it is important to note that there is a
second important divide within the Spanish political system along with the normal left vs.
right cleavage. This second dimension of Spanish politics is the center vs periphery
cleavage. With the way the Spanish state is set up with separate autonomous communities
that have varying levels of autonomy and decentralization, there are parties that exist with
agendas not necessarily based around the typical left-right spectrum but also around the
opinions for or against further decentralization. This, rather than the typical left-right
divide, is the basis of this paper. While a left vs. right ideology is undeniably important
when studying center vs. periphery parties, it is not guaranteed that parties on either side
16

of the center-periphery cleavage are always right or always left. Generally, the Spanish
parties that are proponents of a more centralized state and less autonomy for specific
autonomous communities are more on the right. However, with parties that are
proponents of further decentralization are much more varied. As they, the “regionalist”
parties, are generally specific to an autonomous community, there is no set ideology or
political leanings that is true across all the “regionalist” parties.

Spanish Exceptionalism
The concept of “Spanish Exceptionalism” (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019, Ortiz
Barquero 2019) refers to the lack of a far-right extremist party in Spain’s recent history
when other European countries have had recent movements for these types of parties.
This “Spanish Exceptionalism” was even more curious when considering that Spain has
many of the normal conditions for this type of far-right movement including the
economic and unemployment troubles Spain faces (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019). However,
with the rise of the political party Vox, there seems to be an end to what was once
“Spanish Exceptionalism.” This is one of the curiosities that prompted this particular
research into studying why voters have decided to vote for a party like Vox. This growth
has been different across Spain with more support in certain autonomous communities
than others. This was marked by Vox’s success in the regional elections in Andalusia in
2018 that showed that “Spanish Exceptionalism” was truly over.
There have been recent studies attempting to explain “why now?” with regards to
the end of Spanish Exceptionalism. In a study by Turnbull-Dugarte (2019), it was noted
that at the time of the growth of Vox, Spain had been facing newer issues that generally
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spark political movements of this nature. Two of these issues were the Catalan
independence movement holding a referendum for Catalan Independence and the growth
of the migrant population in Spain of which the opinions against the further autonomy of
regions like Catalonia proved to be significant in voting for Vox (Turnbull-Dugarte
2019).
An economic explanation for the end of “Spanish Exceptionalism” is that the rise
of Vox in Spain can be attributed to the theory concerning the “losers” of modernization
or globalization; Ortiz Barquero (2019) looks at this explanation among others noting that
Andalusia, an autonomous community with a higher level of support for Vox, has had a
lower GDP per capita. This theory proposes that individuals who are negatively affected
by a more modern and globalized world tend to use immigrants and minorities as a
scapegoat for their own economic problems (Ortiz Barquero 2019). In the case of Spain,
this would seem to push voters affected by modernization towards Vox, a party with antiimmigrant stances. As Ortiz Barquero (2019) points out, this anti-immigration stance
would only be aided by the idea that immigrants are a threat to the idea of the
homogenous nation. This economic theory about why individuals turn to far-right
movements combine both ideas about nationalism and the push against immigration that
are both important to Vox in Spain. However, Spain has been having economic issues
before the rise of Vox, and this particular theory does not have much support in the
findings of Ortiz Barquero (2019).

18

Case Overview
The four cases I study are the autonomous communities of Andalusia, Catalonia,
Galicia, and Murcia. They represent a spectrum of nationalist sentiment as well as levels
of support for regionalist and nationalist political parties. Table 2-1 summarizes how
individuals feel regarding their national identity in each case. This “nationalist sentiment”
represents whether each respondent identifies more with Spain, their autonomous
community, or both equally. In the surveys in which this data was found, the respondents
were asked which of the statements they most agreed with.
Andalusia and Murcia are the cases that identify least with their autonomous
community with Catalonia and Galicia identifying the most with their autonomous
community. One reason to explain this is that Catalonia and Galicia are both “historic
nations” that received autonomy sooner than other autonomous communities. They also
both have a more distinct culture from Spain as a whole. Both have their own regional
languages: Catalan and Gallego. However, there is also some difference between these
two cases. Catalonia has a higher percentage of respondents that feel more Catalan than
Spanish. There is also a difference between Andalusia and Murcia. Andalusia has higher
levels of nationalist sentiment than Murcia. These autonomous communities represent a
spectrum of nationalist sentiment in this way.

19

Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics of Nationalist Sentiment Across Cases
Level of Nationalist Sentiment

Andalusia

Catalonia

Galicia

Murcia

Feel only Spanish

5.9

5.5

3.5

8.8

Feel more Spanish than ----

5.7

6.3

3.6

4.8

Feel as Spanish as ----

74.2

38.2

68.8

83.1

Feel more ---- than Spanish

10.0

24.4

18.8

1.9

Feel Uniquely/Only ----

1.1

21.5

4.0

0.3

N.S.

1.0

1.2

0.4

0.6

N.C.

2.2

2.8

0.9

0.5

Total Respondents

2,913

2,450

2,865

791

Source: “Postelectoral de Cataluña. Elecciones Autonómicas 2017” (2017) , “Postelectoral Elecciones
Autonómicas 2018 Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía” (2018), “Postelectoral de Galicia. Elecciones
Autonómicas 2016” (2016), “Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas 2015. Región de Murcia 2015” (2015)

There is also a similar pattern when looking at our dependent variables. Votes for
regionalist parties are highest in Catalonia and Galicia. While neither Andalusia nor
Murcia have much regionalist party support on a national level, Andalusia does have
regionalist parties that gain support in regional elections. Andalusia and Murcia also have
the higher level of Vox support while Catalonia and Galicia have much less. Hamann
(1999) gathered data to classify each autonomous community into three categories
depending on how much support for regionalist parties was present in each autonomous
community. His three classifications were as follows: 1. Regionalist parties have won a
majority in an election, 2. Regionalist parties have at least ten percent of the vote, and 3.
Regionalist parties have less than ten percent of the vote (Hamann 1999). Of my cases,
Catalonia fell under the first category, Galicia and Andalusia fell under the second
category, and Murcia fell under the third category (Hamann 1999). However, it is
important to note that Hamann’s (1999) data and classifications is outdated. While this
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data is old, it does show how the autonomous communities stood then and how they have
changed since then.
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Chapter 3
Political Parties

Although Spain has many different political parties, only certain parties receive a
high enough level of support that would make them competitive in national or even
autonomous community elections. The two most widely supported parties are Partido
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Partido Popular (PP). PSOE is the mainstream
left-wing party while PP is the mainstream right-wing party. My research pertains to
peripheral parties that do not receive enough votes to be a contender to be the party of the
government, at least not on their own.
The political parties included in my analysis are parties that satisfy two criteria: 1)
The party qualifies as either a regionalist party within Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, or
Murcia or a nationalist party. 2) The party was indicated as the party for which at least
one respondent in the survey data intended to vote. In Table 3-1, I have classified each
political party that fits the criteria as either “nationalist” or “regionalist” according to the
definitions of each of those terms that I have previously set forward in this paper. I have
also included, if they are regionalist parties, which region they correspond to.
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Table 3-1 Spanish Political Parties
Political Party

Party Type

Area of Influence

Vox

Nationalist

National

Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciudadanía (C’s) or Ciudadanos

Nationalist

National

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)

Regionalist

Catalonia

Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP)

Regionalist

Catalonia

En Comú-Podem (ECP)

Regionalist

Catalonia

Junts per Catalunya (JxCAT)

Regionalist

Catalonia

Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)

Regionalist

Galicia

En Marea

Regionalist

Galicia

En Común-Unidas Podemos

Regionalist

Galicia

Source: Parties found from CIS surveys: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

In the following sections, I briefly discuss each political party included in my
analysis along with some descriptive statistics that help demonstrate their role in my
analysis.

Nationalist Parties
The category “nationalist parties” includes parties that are Spanish nationalist
parties: Ciudadanos and Vox. Using survey data, I show how respondents viewed these
particular parties in relation to the two mainstream parties on a 10-point left-right
ideological scale. (see Table 3-2). We can see that the mainstream right-wing PP is very
similar to Ciudadanos in terms of the public’s perception of its ideology while Vox is
much farther to the right. This is due to what we know about the origin and trajectory of
Ciudadanos.
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Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics of Left-Right Placement of Political Parties (1= Most
Left; 10 = Most Right)
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

PSOE

4.15

1.57

PP

7.83

1.38

Ciudadanos

7.03

1.71

Vox

9.38

1.25

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)

Ciudadanos is much less extreme than Vox. However, it is important to include in
this analysis because it is a party that was born of anti-regionalism in Catalonia. This
makes it a potential alternative to Vox in the eyes of voters who oppose greater regional
autonomy but do not see themselves as extreme as Vox. To only use Vox as a measure of
nationalist party variables would potentially leave out groups of voters.
Ciudadanos began in 2006 in Catalonia as a rejection of the regionalist parties
there that were focused on greater autonomy and cultural distinctiveness for the
autonomous community (Teruel and Barrio 2016). As this party grew to be a national
party with support in national elections and in other regional elections across Spain, its
discourse and aims have shifted. However, its origins make it relevant for my analysis,
especially as an alternative for Catalan voters who may primarily see it as a party against
the regionalist parties of Catalonia that advocate for more autonomy and at the extreme,
independence.
Vox is a newer party on the right that has recently emerged and grown in
popularity. Andalusia and Murcia have shown some of the highest support and growth of
Vox in Spain. This is a party that advocates Spanish nationalism as well as other ideas
rooted in the far-right. This party’s recent popularity ended what was known as “Spanish
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Exceptionalism” since Spain had for so long avoided the rise of the radical right that was
occurring throughout Europe in recent history. One explanation includes the Catalan
Independence Movement being a trigger for its growth and popularity (Turnbull-Dugarte
2019). Another possibility is preferences for a more central Spanish state as well as rightleaning ideology to be some of the factors explaining Vox support (Ortiz Barquero 2019).

Regionalist Parties
The regionalist parties included in this analysis are only the regionalist parties that
received some “intention to vote for” in one of my four cases. Catalonia and Galicia both
had political parties that fit these criteria. In order to see if there is some difference in the
regionalist parties from each of the two cases, I have also separated them into separate
dependent variables.

Catalan Regionalist Parties
Catalonia has a wide variety of regionalist political parties. Many of them lean left
but not all. Some of them advocate for total independence while others only for greater
autonomy. The four Catalan regionalist parties that met the criteria for my analysis are
Junts per Catalunya (JxCat, Together for Catalonia), Esquerra Republicana de
Catalumya (ERC, Catalan Republican Left), Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP,
Popular Unity Candidacy), and En Comúm Podem (ECP, In Common We Can).
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Galician Regionalist Parties
The Galician regionalist parties that managed to receive votes in the general
elections are fewer. Unlike the Catalan regionalist parties, they do not have the same
national influence. There were three that fit the criteria including two that are more
similar to coalitions with some Galician regionalist interests and parties included.
However, they were included in the analysis because the Galician voter would be able to
recognize where their interests were represented. The three parties are Bloque
Nacionalista Galego (BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc), Unidas-Podemos (United We
Can), and En Marea.
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Chapter 4
Data and Analysis

My data comes from a national survey conducted by the Centro de
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in Spain. This organization conducts multiple studies
throughout the year including national barometers for each month, as well as pre- and
post-election surveys within each autonomous community for elections at the regional
level. For general elections, the barometers in the electoral months are targeted to
election-related questions, such as about vote intention and other political variables. I use
the November 2019 Barometer. This survey was administered through interviews within
the period of October 28 to November 9, 2019. The general election took place on
November 10. Every autonomous community was included in this survey, which had
4,805 total participants out of 5,000 potential respondents. Within my cases of interest,
there were varying numbers of responses. In Andalusia, there were 651 respondents of
the 700 potential respondents. In Catalonia, there were 586 respondents of the 594
potential respondents. In Galicia, there were 250 respondents of 250 potential
respondents. In Murcia, there were 192 respondents of 200 potential respondents. The
number of potential surveys dispensed in each autonomous community was determined
by population
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Dependent Variables
My dependent variables are the intention to vote for the specific types of political
parties and specific political parties in the then-upcoming November 10 election. I
discussed how specific political parties are classified in the previous chapter. However, in
the context of my analysis, the dependent variable (party type) is labelled as “nationalist,”
“Vox,” “regionalist,” “Catalan regionalist,” and “Galician regionalist.” Each of these was
then converted into binary variables. They are coded as 0 if respondents did not intend to
vote for the indicated party or type of party and coded as 1 if the respondents intended to
vote for the indicated party.
Table 4-1 presents some descriptive statistics on each dependent variable. As
previously discussed, the variables are coded as binary variables. One can see that each of
these types of parties are peripheral parties. The majority of respondents did not intend to
vote for any of the parties included in the dependent variables. However, the voters that
did intend to vote for one of these peripheral parties are the interest of further analysis.

Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Intention to vote for Nationalist Parties

0.12

0.33

Intention to vote for Vox

0.07

0.26

Intention to vote for Regionalist Parties

0.06

0.24

Intention to vote for Catalan Regionalist Parties

0.05

0.21

Intention to vote for Galician Regionalist Parties

0.01

0.11

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
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Independent Variables
My independent variables are divided into categories for the purposes of
organization. I have demographic, performance, and political variables. The demographic
variables include gender, age, religiosity, and education level. Along with the traditional
demographic variables, I have also included the economic variable of personal income.
My performance variables are an evaluation of the current economic situation in Spain
and an evaluation of the current political situation in Spain. My political variables include
marking the Catalan Independence Movement as a current major issue in Spain, marking
immigration as a current major issue in Spain, whether or not the Catalan Independence
Movement influenced the vote of the respondent, and a self-placement on the left-right
spectrum. Below, I discuss how I coded each variable for the analysis. For variables that
included answers of “Did not answer” or “Did not know,” I removed those answers from
the data and turned them into missing values. I wanted my analysis to focus on the
respondents that had an answer to the question posed.
The demographic variables are coded as follows. The variable of gender is coded
as a binary variable with 1 being “male” and 0 being “female.” The variable of age has
not been changed. It remains the same as that of the original data.
The variable of religiosity is condensed into three categories. The first category
(coded 1) is titled “Religious” and includes the answers of “Practicing Catholic” and
“Other Religion”. The second category (coded 2) is solely the answer “Non-practicing
Catholic.” I chose to make this a separate category from the “Religious” category because
it is very common in Spain to have people who are culturally Catholic but are not actively
religious. There is a large portion of the population that falls into this category, and this
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group of people may behave differently to the group that consider themselves actively
religious. The third category (coded 3) is the “Nonreligious” category and includes those
that answered “Agnostic,” “Indifferent/No belief,” and “Atheist.”
The variable of education level has been condensed into seven categories. The
first category (coded 1) is those that reported less than 5 years of education or no
education. The second category (coded 2) is those that reported having a primary
education. The third category (coded 3) is those that reported having the first step of a
secondary education (in Spain this means not continuing on to Bacherillato). The fourth
category (coded 4) is those that completed the second step of secondary education
(Bacherillato). The fifth category (coded 5) is those that reported some type of vocational
or professional training. The sixth category (coded 6) is all types of higher degrees. The
seventh category (coded 7) is any other degrees not specifically asked about in the
survey. In summary, the general trend of this variable is that a higher number is
equivalent to a higher level of education.
I decided to use personal income as a more economic-related demographic
variable. This variable differs from the variable of household income. I am interested in
potentially distinguishing a certain group of people through the use of the variable of
personal income. When comparing the distributions of both personal income and
household income, household income is normally distributed. Personal income is not
normally distributed as it has a large group of individuals that reported little or no
personal income. This group disappears when looking at the normally distributed
household income. This implies that there is a group of people who live in a household
with income, but personally, they lack their own income. This group of people could be
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the unemployed, most likely younger individuals caught up in the youth unemployment
crisis in Spain and still living at home. Is this group of people more likely to vote for
peripheral parties as a result of their dissatisfaction? By using personal income over
household income, I can take this specific group into account.
The performance variables of economic evaluation and political evaluation have
both been condensed into three categories. The first category (coded 1) is “Positive
Feelings” about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answers
“good” and “very good.” The second category (coded 2) includes respondents who have
neither positive nor negative feelings about the economic or political situation. This
corresponds to the answer “regular.” The third category (coded 3) is “Negative Feelings”
about the economic or political situation. This corresponds to the answers “bad” and
“very bad.”
The political variables are slightly more complicated. The variables pertaining to
perception of major issues in Spain as either the Catalan Independence Movement or
immigration are the combination of three questions asked in the survey. The survey asked
the participants what they perceived as the major issues in Spain. They were asked for a
first choice, second choice, and third choice in three separate questions. I combined the
answers of these three questions into one binary variable for each response of interest:
Catalan Independence Movement and Immigration. If a respondent listed the Catalan
Independence Movement in any of the three choices, they were coded as 1 for “yes” (i.e.,
the respondent viewed CIM as an important issue). Respondents who did not list this
were coded as 0 for “no.” I used the same process for the issue of immigration. If a
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respondent answer immigration for any of their three choices, they were coded as 1 or
“yes” (and 0 for “no” if they did not).
The variable of whether or not the Catalan Independence Movement affected their
vote was directly asked by the survey as a yes or no question. Therefore, those that
replied “yes” are coded as 1, while the respondents that answered “no” are coded as 2. It
is important to note that the reply of “yes” does not necessarily mean that influenced their
decision to vote or not to vote for a certain party. Instead, it can refer to deciding to vote
at all or not to vote at all. It can also mean changing one’s party preference. It is a general
question asking if the Catalan Independence Movement had any influence at all on one’s
voting behavior prior to the November 2019 general election.
The variable of self-placement on a left-right scale is simple. It is a scale of 1 to
10 with 1 corresponding to the “most left” and 10 corresponding to the “most right.”
Table 4-2 displays similar descriptive data of the independent variables that was
shown in Table 4-1 regarding the dependent variables. Also included is the minimum and
maximum for each variable since the variables have varying numbers of categories and
ways in which they were coded.

Table 4-2 Here

Methodology
From my hypotheses discussed earlier in this paper, the variables I am most interested
in are the political evaluation, the direct question about if the Catalan Independence
Movement affected the vote, and both major issue variables (immigration and the Catalan
Independence Movement). Regarding Spain, both immigration and controversy surround
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decentralization are topics of interest regarding the choice to vote for far-right nationalist
political parties. However, throughout this analysis, I will also be looking at demographic
variables, other evaluation variables, and other political variables. I will be conducting
five logistic regression models for each of my five dependent variables. The models will
be organized in the following manner:
●

Model 1: Demographic variables only

●

Model 2: Demographic and performance variables

●

Model 3: Demographic and political variables

●

Model 4: Repetition of Model 3 with the deletion of one political variable

●

Model 5: All variables

Each model includes all demographic and economic variables. Models 2 and 3 are
straightforward in that they will build on Model 1 with one additional category of the
independent variables each. Model 4 is almost exactly the same as Model 3, but it
excludes whether the Catalan Independence Movement influenced the vote of the
respondent. Since this variable could potentially be very similar to the Major Issue
variable pertaining to the Catalan Independence Movement, I wanted to see the
significance of this variable without the interference. Model 5 consists of all the
variables.

Analysis
Below, Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 show the results of the regression
analysis done for each dependent variable. The data shows that the most distinction
between voters of regionalist and nationalist parties come from the demographic
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variables. However, there are also many variables that prove significant in the same ways
across all the party types showing that they are significant for both types of the peripheral
parties in the same way. All hypotheses with the exception of H4 have at least some
support in the data.

Nationalist Parties
“Nationalist parties” includes both Ciudadanos and Vox. While Vox is a more
extreme, peripheral party, Ciudadanos is becoming more mainstream. This means that
this category may contain a more general group of respondents and voters. Table 4-3
shows the results of regression analysis. There are a number of variables that are highly
significant with a few that are highly significant in all models. This analysis of the
nationalist parties provides support for H1 in Model 2, H2 in Models 3 and 5, and H3 in
Models 3-5. H4 does not have support with nationalist parties. Since respondents for
“nationalist parties” also said that the Catalan Independence Movement did have an
influence on their vote, this could signify that while they see it as important, these voters
do not see it as one of the top three major issues in Spain. In a more targeted question
where they do not have to prioritize issues, it matters. However, in a more general
question that contains a multitude of potential responses, it is not as important. If this is
the case and the reasoning behind this unexpected result, then it could signify that the
idea of the Catalan Independence Movement is not as important to these voters as
previously thought.
Other significant variables with regard to the intention to vote for nationalist
parties are age, religiosity, personal income, the economic evaluation, and the left-right
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self-placement. These results suggest that those more likely to vote for nationalist parties
are younger, more religious, have a higher income, have negative feelings about the
economy, and have a more right-leaning ideology. In some of the models, male
respondents are slightly more likely to support nationalist parties. These results do not
support the losers of modernization theory since they are not only not significantly lower
income but they tend to have a higher income. However, these results do support a
common idea that individuals who are more traditional and religious would be more
likely to vote for anti-immigrant, far-right parties as a result of seeing them as a threat to
their religious and conservative values (Ortiz Barquero 2019).

Table 4-3 Here

Vox
Vox supporters seem to be a more specific group. When isolating these voters, we
can see more significant relationships and determinants with this particular analysis.
Table 4-4 displays the results from the regression models focusing only on Vox
supporters. From this table, we can see similar support for these hypotheses as those of
the nationalist parties. H1, H2, and H3 all have support while H4 does not have support.
Like the voters of the “nationalist” category, Vox-specific voters are generally younger,
more religious, with a higher income, negative feelings about the economy, and right
leaning. However, what differs from the voters of the larger category is that Vox voters
are also less educated and more significantly male. This difference helps us distinguish
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between those that choose to vote for a less extreme alternative with the voters who chose
to vote more extreme.

Table 4-4 Here

Regionalist Parties
The results of the regression analysis of support for regionalist parties are shown
in Table 4-5. Since H3 only pertained to Vox and nationalist parties, H3 is excluded from
this analysis. According to the results of this regression, H1 and H2 both have support.
H4 has support in Model 4 when the variable that may be causing its significance to not
surface is removed from the regression. With regionalist parties, there is not significance
with the gender of the respondents nor with the choice of immigration as a major issue. In
addition to the variables discussed in the hypotheses, the profile of a voter for regionalist
parties is older (in some models), less religious, with higher level of education, higher
income, negative feelings about economic situation, and left-leaning ideology.

Table 4-5 Here

Catalan Regionalist Parties
Narrowing down the broad “regionalist parties”' variable to just Catalan
regionalist parties in Table 4-6, we see that there is similar support for three hypotheses
with H1, H2, and H4 all having support. However, H4 does have more support with this
series of regression. This makes sense as the Catalan Independence Movement is perhaps
most salient for voters of Catalan-specific regionalist parties. Similar to the larger
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category of regionalist parties, there is no significant relationship with seeing
immigration as a major issue. However, there is some significance in some models with
voters being female. Other than this difference, the voter profile is nearly identical to the
larger category.

Table 4-6 Here
Galician Regionalist Parties
The voters for the Galician regionalist parties are the most different compared to
the other regionalist party dependent variables. The results of each regression model are
shown in Table 4-7. Of the hypotheses, there is no support for any of the hypotheses. In
fact, the opposite is true for H4 which states that the Catalan Independence Movement
will be seen as a major issue for voters of all types of parties. While H4 has had the least
support of any of the hypotheses, with Galician regionalist party voters there is actually a
significant relationship of not seeing the Catalan Independence Movement as a major
issue.
The profile of a Galician regionalist party voter is female (in some models), less
religious, with higher education, negative feelings about the economy, and left-leaning
ideology. The variables that have no significant relationship are age, personal income, the
political evaluation, seeing immigration as a major issue, and the influence of the Catalan
Independence Movement on the vote.

Table 4-7 Here
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Results Summary and Discussion
By looking at each set of regressions for each dependent variable together, we can
see which variables are the most influential and which of my original hypotheses have the
most support throughout all the dependent variables and models. These individual-level
determinants can help form a profile of a certain type of voter whether it be a voter for
regionalist or nationalist political parties.
H1 which stated that as negative feelings about the current political situation
increase, the support for peripheral parties would increase is supported in the analysis.
This was supported by all sets of regression models with the exception of Galician
regionalist party voters. It makes sense that a dissatisfaction with the current political
climate and mainstream parties would lead to voters looking elsewhere for their support.
This is reminiscent of the idea of the linkage theory in which parties that fail to represent
or connect with the voters “fail” (Lawson and Merkl 1988).
H2 that connected the choice to vote for peripheral parties with marking yes that
their vote was influenced by the Catalan Independence Movement is also supported in a
similar manner. All sets of regression models supported this hypothesis except Galician
regionalist parties. The mechanism linking these variables is of course that a strong
opinion about the Catalan independence movement would lead to voting for a party that
also has clear stances on this movement. That would of course refer to nearly all of our
parties including nationalist, Vox, regionalist, and Catalan regionalist. However, it also
would help understand why Galician regionalist parties do not have support for this
hypothesis. Galician regionalist parties are somewhat separate from this issue as they are
not directly for or against Catalan independence.
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H3 focused more on nationalist parties or more specifically, Vox. It stated that
respondents who perceive immigration as a major issue in Spain would be the
respondents more likely to vote for nationalist parties or Vox in particular. This was
supported by the relevant sets of regressions. Immigration was an important variable
pertaining to the nationalist type parties but not with the regionalist type parties.
H4 was the least supported hypothesis. It stated that voters of all types of parties
would record the Catalan Independence Movement as a major issue in Spain. However,
this was primarily only done by respondents who voted for Catalan Regionalist Parties.
However, it is interesting to note that all types of parties, excluding Galician regionalist
parties, had a significant relationship with the variable of the influence that the movement
had on their vote. This shows that while it did influence their vote in some way, it was
not important enough to be considered a major issue in Spain by the nationalist parties,
Vox, and regionalist parties (except in one model).
The analysis reveals certain variables that were very important or significant but
were not predicted by my hypotheses. These were age, religiosity, gender, education
level, personal income, the economic evaluation, and self-placement on the ideological
scale. There was some variation in how these variables were related to the different
dependent variables and in some cases if they were significant at all. These specific
results are summarized in Table 4-8. This table summarizes the profiles of each type of
voter with each significant variable. However, it is important to note that some of these
significant variables are only significant in some of the models.

Table 4-8 Here

39

These results demonstrate that it is primarily demographic variables that affect
voting behavior for Spain’s peripheral parties. These demographic variables are more
important in the analysis compared to general policy opinions and perceptions of the
current state of politics and the economy in Spain. Seeing regionalist and nationalist
political parties as opposites across the center-periphery cleavage in Spain has support in
the demographic “opposites” seen in the analysis. Many of the general political variables
such as having negative feelings about the current state of Spain are significant in the
same manner for both types of peripheral parties. This leads to the conclusion that while
certain dissatisfaction can lead to a voter choosing to support a party on the periphery, the
demographic variables are determinants of which side of the center-periphery divide to
support: regionalist or nationalist.
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Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables
Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

0.48

0.50

0.00

1.00

Age

50.96

17.90

18

98

Religiosity (1= Most Religious, 3 =
Least Religious)

2.05

0.73

1.00

3.00

Education Level

4.22

1.60

1.00

7.00

4.32

2.09

1.00

11.00

Economic Evaluation (1 = Positive
Feelings)

2.45

0.60

1.00

3.00

Political Evaluation

2.78

0.46

1.00

3.00

Catalan Independence Movement as
Major Issue (1 = Yes)

0.19

0.39

0.00

1.00

Immigration as Major Issue (1 = Yes)

0.12

0.32

0.00

1.00

Catalan Independence Movement
Influence on Vote (2 = No)

1.57

0.50

1.00

2.00

Left-Right Orientation Scale (1=
Most Left; 10 = Most Right)

4.67

2.07

1.00

10.00

Demographic Variables
Gender
(1 = Male)

Economic Variables
Personal Income
Performance Variables

(1 = Positive Feelings)
Political Variables

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
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Table 4-3 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Nationalist Parties
Independent Variables

Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:

Model 4:

Model 5:

Male

0.209*
(0.111)

0.221**
(0.113)

-0.006 (0.132)

-0.001
(0.131)

-0.003
(0.134)

Age

-0.034***
(0.004)

-0.035***
(0.004)

-0.037***
(0.004)

-0.037***
(0.004)

-0.039***
(0.004)

Lack of Religiosity

-0.593***
(0.778)

-0.616***
(0.079)

-0.043 (0.100)

-0.028
(0.100)

-0.032
(0.102)

Education Level

-0.014
(0.040)

-0.013
(0.040)

-0.038 (0.047)

-0.016
(0.047)

-0.030
(0.048)

Personal Income

0.117***
(0.029)

0.122***
(0.029)

0.092***
(0.033)

0.098***
(0.033)

0.097***
(0.033)

Economic Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

0.275***
(0.097)

0.257**
(0.113)

Political Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

0.437***
(0.142)

0.184
(0.163)

Major Issue: Catalan
Independence
Movement

0.139 (0.152)

0.246
(0.150)

0.185
(0.154)

Major Issue:
Immigration

0.791***
(0.160)

0.811***
(0.159)

0.787***
(0.162)

No Influence of
Catalan Independence
on Vote

-0.636***
(0.130)

Self-Placement on
Left-Right Scale
(Right)

0.576***
(0.036)

0.604***
(0.035)

0.580***
(0.036)

-0.616***
(0.132)

LR chi square

131.36

154.82

588.86

571.56

599.46

P-value

0.000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Pseudo R-squared

0.0515

0.0613

0.2541

0.2451

0.2608

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 4-4 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Vox
Independent Variables

Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:

Model 4:

Model 5:

Male

0.604***
(0.145)

0.654***
(0.149)

0.496***
(0.176)

0.508***
(0.174)

0.568***
(0.182)

Age

-0.033***
(0.005)

-0.035***
(0.005)

-0.034***
(0.006)

-0.034***
(0.006)

-0.037***
(0.006)

Lack of Religiosity

-0.727***
(0.099)

-0.783***
(0.102)

-0.199
(0.133)

-0.178
(0.132)

-0.208
(0.138)

Education Level

-0.101**
(0.051)

-0.089*
(0.051)

-0.131**
(0.061)

-0.104*
(0.061)

-0.103
(0.063)

Personal Income

0.137***
(0.038)

0.154***
(0.039)

0.114***
(0.043)

0.118***
(0.043)

0.121***
(0.044)

Economic Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

0.774***
(0.138)

0.853***
(0.164)

Political Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

1.064***
(0.253)

0.849***
(0.295)

Major Issue: Catalan
Independence
Movement

-0.309
(0.205)

-0.175
(0.201)

-0.231
(0.211)

Major Issue:
Immigration

1.311***
(0.184)

1.339***
(0.182)

1.309***
(0.190)

No Influence of
Catalan Independence
on Vote

-0.748***
(0.174)

Self-Placement on
Left-Right Scale
(Right)

0.648***
(0.045)

0.680***
(0.045)

0.652***
(0.046)

-0.684***
(0.180)

LR chi square

111.42

189.50

515.42

503.49

564.99

P-value

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Pseudo R-squared

0.0631

0.1085

0.3224

0.3132

0.3566

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 4-5 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Regionalist Parties
Independent Variables

Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:

Model 4:

Model 5:

Male

-0.165
(0.173)

-0.140
(0.176)

0.041
(0.187)

-0.115
(0.178)

0.090
(0.191)

Age

0.009
(0.006)

0.011*
(0.006)

0.010
(0.007)

0.004
(0.006)

0.012*
(0.007)

Lack of Religiosity

1.020***
(0.143)

1.036***
(0.145)

0.448***
(0.157)

0.444***
(0.151)

0.428***
(0.160)

Education Level

0.237***
(0.068)

0.265***
(0.068)

0.193***
(0.073)

0.197***
(0.070)

0.234***
(0.074)

Personal Income

0.147***
(0.047)

0.173***
(0.048)

0.122**
(0.052)

0.144***
(0.049)

0.150***
(0.053)

Economic Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

0.689***
(0.165)

0.683***
(0.176)

Political Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

1.138***
(0.332)

1.197***
(0.349)

Major Issue: Catalan
Independence
Movement

0.228
(0.222)

0.521**
(0.212)

0.204
(0.228)

Major Issue:
Immigration

-0.366
(0.375)

-0.422
(0.362)

-0.252
(0.379)

No Influence of Catalan
Independence on Vote

-1.852***
(0.205)

Self-Placement on LeftRight Scale (Right)

-0.592***
(0.061)

-0.533***
(0.059)

-0.594***
(0.0616)

-1.820***
(0.209)

LR chi square

123.15

169.31

305.85

209.75

346.74

P-value

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Pseudo R-squared

0.0960

0.1325

0.2486

0.1693

0.2826

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 4-6 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Catalan Regionalist
Parties
Independent Variables

Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:

Model 4:

Model 5:

Male

-0.337*
(0.194)

-0.326*
(0.197)

-0.156
(0.208)

-0.312
(0.199)

-0.129
(0.214)

Age

0.011*
(0.007)

0.014**
(0.007)

0.013*
(0.008)

0.005
(0.007)

0.015*
(0.008)

Lack of Religiosity

0.919***
(0.156)

0.943***
(0.159)

0.374**
(0.173)

0.395**
(0.165)

0.371**
(0.178)

Education Level

0.201***
(0.075)

0.226***
(0.075)

0.143*
(0.082)

0.154**
(0.077)

0.186**
(0.083)

Personal Income

0.181***
(0.053)

0.209***
(0.054)

0.145**
(0.058)

0.174***
(0.056)

0.177***
(0.060)

Economic Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

0.595***
(0.183)

0.599***
(0.195)

Political Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

2.570***
(0.716)

2.671***
(0.729)

Major Issue: Catalan
Independence Movement

0.483**
(0.233)

0.806***
(0.221)

0.440*
(0.240)

Major Issue:
Immigration

-0.238
(0.400)

-0.307
(0.383)

-0.092
(0.408)

No Influence of Catalan
Independence on Vote

-2.453***
(0.274)

Self-Placement on LeftRight Scale (Right)

-0.559***
(0.066)

-0.484***
(0.064)

-0.568***
(0.067)

-2.424***
(0.278)

LR chi square

88.58

144.23

270.49

152.10

321.11

P-value

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Pseudo R-squared

0.0830

0.1356

0.2629

0.1475

0.3129

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 4-7 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Votes for Galician Regionalist
Parties
Independent Variables

Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:

Model 4:

Model 5:

Male

0.451
(0.372)

0.495
(0.374)

0.673*
(0.390)

0.576
(0.377)

0.730*
(0.392)

Age

0.001
(0.013)

-0.000
(0.013)

0.001
(0.014)

0.000
(0.013)

-0.000
(0.014)

Lack of Religiosity

1.354***
(0.350)

1.336***
(0.350)

0.744**
(0.375)

0.654*
(0.358)

0.741**
(0.376)

Education Level

0.350**
(0.027)

0.373**
(0.151)

0.316**
(0.156)

0.320**
(0.153)

0.336**
(0.156)

Personal Income

0.027
(0.093)

0.045
(0.093)

0.027
(0.100)

0.022
(0.098)

0.042
(0.101)

Economic Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

0.910***
(0.349)

0.804**
(0.360)

Political Evaluation:
Negative Feelings

-0.428
(0.391)

-0.456
(0.410)

Major Issue: Catalan
Independence Movement

-1.809*
(1.029)

-1.781*
(1.025)

-1.762*
(1.031)

Major Issue:
Immigration

-0.870
(1.029)

-0.932
(1.028)

-0.897
(1.035)

No Influence of Catalan
Independence on Vote

-0.160
(0.365)

Self-Placement on LeftRight Scale (Right)

-0.613***
(0.135)

-0.625***
(0.133)

-0.591***
(0.135)

-0.100
(0.368)

LR chi square

41.19

48.30

75.07

75.63

80.33

P-value

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Pseudo R-squared

0.1064

0.1251

0.2032

0.1996

0.2178

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
*Note *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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Table 4-8 Profiles of Types of Voters
Variables

Nationalist
Voters

Vox
Voters

Regionalist
Voters

Catalan
Regionalist
Voters

Galician
Regionalist
Voters

Demographic Variables
Gender

male

male

---

female

female

Age

younger

younger

older

older

---

Religiosity

more
religious

more
religious

less
religious

less religious

less religious

Education Level

---

less
educated

more
educated

more
educated

more
educated

higher

higher

higher

---

Economic Variables
Personal Income

higher

Performance Variables
Economic
Evaluation

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

Political
Evaluation

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

negative
feelings

---

Catalan
Independence
Movement as
Major Issue

---

---

yes

yes

no

Immigration as
Major Issue

yes

yes

---

---

---

Catalan
Independence
Movement
Influence on Vote

yes

yes

yes

yes

---

Left-Right
Orientation Scale

right

right

left

left

left

Political
Variables

Source: “Barómetro de Noviembre 2019” (2019)
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Conclusion
Spain is an interesting case to study political parties and determinants of voting
behavior because not only does the typical left-right cleavage exist, but there is also a
center-periphery divide. This is the result of Spain’s division into seventeen autonomous
communities. Some of these autonomous communities, designated historic nations, have
their own culture and language, and some were granted higher levels of autonomy earlier
on in their history. These particular parties have had strong levels of support for
regionalist political parties. Some of these autonomous communities and political parties
have even advocated for independence with varying levels of support and success.
However, peripheral regionalist parties exist all throughout Spain as does the sense of
belonging to a group other than the “Spanish nation”.
Other political parties have appeared to oppose substate nationalism. Ciudadanos
was created specifically in opposition to Catalan nationalism, and more recently Vox has
emerged a strong proponent of “Spanish-only” nationalism. The purpose of my research
was to study why support for these different types of parties varies across Spain.
In this paper, I used logistic regression to analyze the most important
determinants of voting for five specific groups of political parties in Spain. These parties
were “nationalist”, Vox, “regionalist”, “Catalan regionalist”, and “Galician regionalist.”
From this analysis, I was able to determine that the demographic variables of gender, age,
religiosity, and education level as well as the self-placement on a left-right ideological
scale showed the most difference between the two broad categories of parties. Other
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variables such as economic evaluation, political evaluation, the influence of the Catalan
independence movement on the vote, and income were almost always significant but in
the same manner for all types of peripheral parties with no distinction between
“nationalist” and “regionalist” parties.
From my findings, I found that negative feelings about the current economic and
political situation, a higher income, and having one’s vote be influenced by the Catalan
Independence Movement were the general variables that led to voting for the parties on
the periphery. The variables that distinguished between voting for regionalist and
nationalist parties were primarily the demographic variables as well as the left-right
preferences. Nationalist and Vox voters were generally male, younger, more religious,
less educated, and had a right-leaning ideology. Most regionalist voters were generally
female, older, less religious, more educated, and had a left-leaning ideology.
While much existing research exists looking at autonomous communities as a
whole regarding support for certain types of parties in Spain, this research looks only at
individual-level data. While research analyzing data at the level of autonomous
communities looks at variables such as GDP per capita and other broad variables, this
analysis shows that on an individual-level, personal socioeconomic status does not seem
to have an impact on voting intention. This analysis allows a closer look at the individual
voters that exist within the broader context of their autonomous communities.
From the results of the analysis, one can see that demographic variables are the
primary distinction between regionalist and nationalist voters. Topics that one might
assume to be more impactful, such as specific political opinions on immigration and
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decentralization, turn out to not be as important when differentiating between these two
types of voters.
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